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Sweeney advocates fear, tend to encourage jail-breaking and bail-
jumping. Unfortunately, it appears that Hunt itself has fallen victim
to this danger; the only "irreparable harm" the petitioner would
face upon return to Arizona would be restraint of freedom while in
jail or out on bail pending appeal of her conviction. Such harm
is hardly irreparable in the Noia sense where the petitioner would
have spent the rest of his life in prison if habeas corpus relief had
been denied. Nor is it comparable to future physical torture in the
demanding state's prison 36 or threatened lynching,3 7 for which reme-
dies in the demanding state would come too late. Minor periods of
detention and the unavailability of monetary compensation for
interim loss of liberty should not be considered irreparable so as
to justify release in an extradition habeas corpus proceeding; rather,




WITHIN LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES
A prevalent trend today is the inclusion of medical payment
coverage within basic liability insurance policies. The wording of
such clauses varies only slightly irrespective of whether they are in a
medical liability policy, an automobile policy, or a homeowner's
policy.1 Generally, the insurer agrees to pay the insured such medical
expenses, within the policy limits, which are occasioned by accidental
injuries if such expenses are incurred within a fixed period of time
from the date of the accident. Litigation concerning when such ex-
penses have actually been incurred within the meaning of the policy
'1Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
3-Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superintendent of County Prisons, 152 Pa.
Super. 167, 31 A.2d 576 (1943).
"Note, Extradition Habeas Corpus, 74 YALE L.J. 78, 126 (1964).
'E.g., Hoehner v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 8 Mich. App. 708, 155 N.W.2d 231,
233 (1967). "'to pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the
date of the accident for necessary medical, surgical and dental services... caused
by accident, (a) while on the premises with the permission of the insured';
Drobne v. Aetna Cas. Se Sur. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. s, 115 N.E.2d 589, 590 (Ct. App.
1950), "[t]o pay to or for each person who sustains bodily injury ... the reasonable
expense of necessary medical . . .services ... all incurred within one year from the
date of the accident"; Marroquin v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 394 S.W.2d 246,
247 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965), "To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one
year from the date of accident ..."
CASE COMMENTS
has produced varying results. Consequently, the extent of the insurer's
liability is not uniformly recognized. The major problem is that the
actual medical service cannot always be rendered within the prescribed
period of limitation.
2
A recent case, Hoehner v. Western Casualty & Surety Company,3
illustrates the reasoning utilized to impose liability upon the insurer
under circumstances which do not facilitate actual performance of the
medical services within the period of limitation imposed by the policy.
On May 31, 1964, Mr. Hoehner's minor son fell and injured his
mouth while visiting on the premises of the insured. The boy was im-
mediately taken to a dentist where temporary treatment was admin-
istered. The boy's teeth were severely damaged, but due to his age,
the dentist advised that further dental work should be postponed until
the boy was older. The basic insuring agreement limited the insurer's
liability to all expenses incurred within one year from the date of
the accident. On April 5, 1965, Mr. Hoehner paid the dentist the full
amount necessary to repair the boy's teeth at a future date, receiving
a receipt with the understanding that service would be performed
when it was deemed proper. Mr. Hoehner then requested payment
from the insurer who rejected such claim on the basis that only those
expenses for services performed within one year were within the
coverage of the policy. 4 The court, interpreting the phrase "expenses
incurred," held that the insurance company becomes liable for pay-
ment when the injured party becomes legally obligated by contracting
within one year following the accident to pay a sum certain for
necessary medical services, although the services might be delayed
for an indeterminate amount of time in the discretion of the treating
physician. Although payment to the physician was actually made
within the year period, the language of -the court implies that actual
payment is not necessary to render the agreement valid.
With the exception that payment generally is required within the
year period, several courts on similar facts have reached a decision
2Annot., 1o A.L.R. 3 d 468, 471 (1966).
'8 Mich. App. 708, 155 N.W.2d 231 (1967).
'A direct action against the insurer is permitted because the injured party,
by entering the premises with the permission of the named insured, becomes an
insured under -the medical provisions of the policy. 155 N.W.2d at 236. This is to
be distinguished from the situation where the injured party attempts to sue the
insurance company under the liability provisions of a policy in which case a
direct action on the policy is generally not allowed in absence of statute. Goodman
v. Georgia Life Ins. Co., 189 Ala. 13o, 66 So. 649 (1914); Combs v. Hunt, 140 Va.
627, 125 S.E. 661 (1924).
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in accord with Hoehner.5 These courts place considerable emphasis
upon the definition of the word "incurred" as used in the policies.0
It is generally recognized that incurred means to become liable for or
subject to liability.7 It follows from this definition that when the
insured engages the future services of a physician within the one year
period and a contract arises which imposes an obligation on the in-
sured to pay a sum certain within the year he has thereby "incurred"
expenses within the limitation period. Thus, the insurer is liable
although the actual services will not be performed within the pre-
scribed period of limitation.8
Earlier cases placed considerable emphasis upon the necessity for
a valid contractual arrangement between patient and physician.9 In
Drobne v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company'o liability was imposed
upon the insurer entirely by reason of a contract between patient and
physician, where the amount of the recovery was entirely dependent
upon the physician's compliance with the contract. In view of Hoehner
and the recently decided Perullo v. Allstate Insurance Company,"
however, it seems that as a practical matter the courts place little
emphasis upon the existence of a legal contract.
Hoehner may be viewed as a transitional case between older
cases which strictly adhere to the necessity of a contractual obligation
to establish liability and Perullo which imposed liability upon the
insurer without discussing contractual obligations. Although Hoehner
does indicate that a contract is necessary, the requirements for
establishing a contract are less rigid than in earlier cases in that pay-
ment need not be made within the year period nor do the actual
negotiations leading to the formation of a contract need be so explicit.
GPerullo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 Misc. 2d 303, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83o (Dist. Ct. 1967);
Drobne v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 115 N.E.2d 589 (Ct. App.
1950); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 289 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956).
Cf., McCleneghan v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 1a Neb. 131, 271 N.W.
276 (937).
OUnited States v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 238 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1956);
Weinberg Co. v. Heller, 73 Cal. App. 769, 239 P. 358 (1925); Irby v. Government
Employee Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 9 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
,Collins v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 271 Minn. 239, 135 N.W.ad 503 (1965);
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Coke, 254 Miss. 936, 183 So. 2d 490 (1966); Nagy v. Lumber-
mens Mut. Cas. Co., 219 A.2d 396 (R.I. 1966).
8Hoehner v. Western Cas. Sc Sur. Co., 8 Mich. App. 708, 155 N.W.2d 231
(1967); Drobne v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 115 N.E.2d 589 (Ct.
App. 195o); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 289 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956).
9Drobne v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 115 N.E.2d 589 (Ct. App.
1950); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 289 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956).
1066 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 115 N.E.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1950).
1154 Misc. 2d 303, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83o (1967).
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In Perullo this gradual erosion of the strict necessity for a legal
contract between patient and physician becomes complete. The in-
jured party incurred expenses beyond -the year period of limitation
and sought to establish liability upon the insurer by alleging an
undefined arrangement with the physician within the year period. It
was difficult to define any contractual arrangement between patient
and physician as there was not an actual fixed sum tendered to the
physician; neither were the arrangements for the operation clearly
defined nor did the court mention the formation of a contract be-
tween the parties.'2 However, the existence of an agreement between
the patient and physician, although not in all cases a legal contact, does
serve as a useful tool in enabling the courts -to logically impose liability
upon the insurer.
Insurance companies contend that the Hoehner interpretation of
the medical clause is a revision of the insurance contract which renders
the insurer liable for all reasonable expenses incurred from the date
of 'the accident, disregarding the period of limitation.' 3 Insurance
companies want to avoid payment of claims where there is a possibility
that the compensated injury may have occurred other than as a result
of the original accident.' 4 The one year limitation helps to assure that
a causal connection will be shown between the accident and resulting
injury.15
Such contentions are clearly worthy of merit and have not been
ignored by the courts. It is generally recognized that such limitation
clauses are necessary in reasonably defining liability.' 6 Yet it is diffi-
cult to deny the injured party medical expenses which directly re-
sult from an accident within the coverage of the policy when the
nature of the injury does not permit medical services to be performed
within the prescribed period of limitation. Therefore, the courts per-
mit the insured to recover those expenses for medical services which
arise directly from the accident regardless of when such services are
to be performed, provided such expenses are ascertainable within one
year from the date of the accident.
2-282 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
'3Marroquin v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 394 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1965). The court stated: "In our opinion in order to hold defendant liable...
we would necessarily have to re-write the provision 'to pay all reasonable expenses
incurred within one year from the date of accident...' to read, 'to pay all reason-
able expenses incurred from the date of accident .... '
"French v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 135 Wis. 259, 115 N.W. 869 (i9o8).
25See Cary v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 127 Wis. 67, lo6 N.W. o55 (1906).
'0See generally Grey v. Silver Bow County, 425 P.2d 819 (Mont. 1967); La-
Barbera v. Batsch, lo Ohio St. 2d io6, 227 N.E.2d 55 (1967); Schmucker v. Naugle,
426 Pa. 203, 231 A.2d 121 (1967).
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The major problem in the application of this liability theory is to
establish an acceptable criteria for ascertaining such expenses with-
out abusing the probability of causal connection. For this reason
courts generally require an agreement between the patient and phy-
sician for future services, for such an agreement conveniently serves
to establish those expenses which are ascertainable as the result of
a timely, competent medical diagnosis within the year period.17 Such
an agreement, although not necessarily a valid legal contract, does
enable the courts to reasonably conclude that expenses which arise as
a result of the agreement are incurred within the meaning of the
policy and have a causal connection with the original injury.' 8
The courts are not requiring, as contended by the insurance com-
panies, that the insurer pay all expenses from the date of the accident,19
but only those expenses which are ascertained within one year as a
result of the accident. Consequently, the one year limitation period
is still in effect to delineate the insurer's liability, as any expenses
which cannot definitely be ascertained within one year are non-
compensable. This conclusion neither works an undue hardship upon
the insurer, nor does it actually extend his liability beyond that for
which he contracted and contemplated. In addition, the insured's
right to receive compensation for injuries which he would normally
expect to receive under the coverage of the policy is preserved.
20
The fact that at present litigation of this problem is rare is no
indication that it will continue to be so. Advance techniques in the
field of medicine necessitates a longer period of diagnosis prior to
the actual corrective services.21 Plastic surgery, now considered a
necessary medical service,22 is being utilized more frequently and in
most cases cannot be performed within one year from the date of
",It is recognized that in the absence of an arrangement within the year
period recovery is generally denied. See, Marroquin v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,
394 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965).
18Drobne v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 115 N.E.2d 589 (Ct. App.
1950); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 289 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956);
Marroquin v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 394 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965).
"Marroquin v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 394 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1965).
"An alternative would be to amend the insuring clause by eliminating the
word incurred and substituting a statement of liability for all reasonable treatment,
confinement or services which occurred within one year from the date of accident.
See, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 97 Ga. App. 529, 1o3 S.E.2d 651 (1958).
"'See, e.g., 2 R. GRAY, ATrORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, 36.10 (3d ed. 1967).
2Reliance Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Booher, 166 So. 2d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
